by
Damien F. Mackey
“Anxious theologians scan the
latest scientific theories to see if they do or do not support the existence of
God. Grave scientists issue their pontifical pronouncements. Sir James Jeans
tells us that God is a great mathematician; Einstein says ‘God is slick but not
mean’; Laplace, answering Napoleon who taxed him with not mentioning God in his
Mécanique Céleste, said: ‘I
have no need of that hypothesis’.”
Gavin
Ardley,
Aquinas and Kant
Recently
I tuned in to watch an SBS TV documentary with the title “Inside Einstein’s
Mind”, and I was intrigued to learn that Einstein had managed, with his theory
of General Relativity, to unlock the laws of nature.
This
documentary is being promoted in the following laudatory terms:
In
November 1915, Einstein published his greatest work: General Relativity, the
theory that transformed our understanding of nature's laws and the entire
history of the cosmos. This documentary tells the story of Einstein's
masterpiece, from the simple but powerful ideas at the heart of relativity, to
the revolution in cosmology still playing out in today's labs, revealing
Einstein's brilliance as never before. (From the US) (Documentary) G CC
One had
to marvel at Albert Einstein’s mathematical skill, his ability to think outside
the square and to embark upon a new course, his powers of concentration, and
his tenacity.
But did
he really succeed in coming to grips with the laws of nature and the origins
and history of the cosmos?
Is the
warp and woof of Einstein’s universe, with its lumpiness and bumpiness, really
the way that the universe is, or the way of Einstein’s own imagination?
Can
God be defined by an elaborate physico-mathematical equation?
Gavin
Ardley well summed up the nature of the new theoretical physics in his classic book,
Aquinas and Kant: the
foundations of the modern sciences (1950).
I take here a part of his:
Chapter IV
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROCRUSTEAN
SCIENCE
The
‘Otherness’ of Modern Physics
Post-Galilean
physical science is cut off from the rest of the world and is the creation of
man himself. Consequently the science, in itself, has no immediate metaphysical
foundations, and no metaphysical implications, in spite of popular beliefs to
the contrary. These beliefs arise from the failure to realise the science’s
‘otherness’, that it belongs to the categorial order and not to the real order.
Only that
which belongs to the real order is directly linked with metaphysics. The
ancient and medieval science of physics belongs to this real order, and is, in
principle, an integral part of philosophy in general. It has
metaphysical foundations and metaphysical implications. [Footnote: This is not
to say that all the particular Aristotelean doctrines of the Earth, the Skies,
the Heavens and so on, are essential to Aristotelean metaphysics. They are
integrated with metaphysics only in their general intention, and not in
particular formulation. They could be modified without necessitating any
change in metaphysical principles since the principles of metaphysics are
founded on more general grounds. Many of the particular Aristotelean opinions
about phenomena were abandoned in the 17th century with the
increasingly detailed knowledge of Nature. Galileo’s Dialogues on the Two
Great Systems of the World is a classic account of this revision of
detailed theories of phenomena. Galileo himself, unlike many of his more
extravagant followers, generally pursued this revision with considerable
moderation. (See Ch. XVII). He is careful to distinguish what is true an
abiding in Aristotle from what is erroneous and non-essential.]
But the
‘new science’ shifted across by degrees into the categorial order and
consequently severed its immediate link with metaphysics. Few people were aware
of this, [Footnote: See Ch. XVII on the enlightened views of such men as
Cardinal Bellarmine in the very early days of the movement. Unfortunately,
Bellarmine’s wise observations were forgotten in later years. See, too, Ch. VI
on Immanuel Kant, who held the clue in the hollow of his hand, but by excess
destroyed it.] least of all the physicists themselves. The general run of
physicists and philosophers have gone on writing learned works on the
metaphysical foundations, and more particularly the metaphysical implications,
of modern physics, oblivious to this change of character. If the theory of the
nature of modern physics put forward in this book is correct, then both these
enquiries are vain.
Works on
the supposed metaphysical foundations of modern physics may have some value
however, even if not in the sense intended by the authors. For, although
logically the supposed foundations are not there, yet psychologically the
metaphysical background may well have prompted the physicist to introduce this
or that Procrustean bed. It is one of the sources of inspiration.
[Footnote: See Ch. XI on Scientific Method.] Such enquiries then are of great
interest to the historian of science as indicating one possible factor which
led physicists to do what they in fact did. But they do not in any way provide
a metaphysical foundation for the science, since a categorial science has no
such foundation, dwelling apart, as it does from the real world. [Footnote:
Such a work is the valuable study of Burtt: The Metaphysical Foundaions of
Modern Science (London, 1925). We might say that the significance of this
work is not logical, as Burtt apparently intended, but psychological and
historical. It is significant that Burtt practically ignores Kant and his
Copernican revolution, which is of vital importance in this matter and leads to
quite different conclusions from Burtt’s (see Ch. VI).
Reference
should be made to E. W. Strong: Procedures and Metaphysics (Univ. of
California Press, 1936) for an examination of the origin of modern physics from
the non-metaphysical point of view advocated in this work. Strong writes (pp.
10-11):
The
operational autonomy of science and the irrelevance of the metaphysical
tradition was a conclusion arising from, rather than being a premise leading
to, the present study. The theory with which the inquiry began was not
confirmed by the evidence, for let it be confessed at the outset that the
original intention was to consolidate the claim that the Platonic tradition was
the metaphysical godfather of modern scientific thought. The study of the
scientific work and opinion of the early-modern period conjoined with a
correlated study of the mathematical aspect of the Platonic tradition revealed
that the original theory was untenable. The problems of mathematicians and
physical investigators were found to be methodological rather than proceeding
from, or based on, metaphysical concepts. The meaning of concepts employed by
mathematicians and scientists in their work was found to be established in the
limited operations and subject matter constituting their science. The
conclusion finally driven home was the conviction that the achievements of
Galileo and his predecessors were in spite of rather than because of prior and
contemporary metaphysical theories of mathematics.
This
contention that there are two lines of activity, one of autonomous procedures,
and the other of metaphysics, is diametrically opposed to Burtt’s thesis of
homogeneity. Strong goes on to develop it with a wealth of historical evidence.
Strong’s conclusions from his examination of the origins of modern
mathematical-physical science in the 16th and 17th centuries lend
powerful support to our basic contention that there are two orders: an
autonomous order of physico-mathematical science, and a real order which is the
province of metaphysics. The contention as advanced here is founded on an examination
of the nature of physical science as we have it today. Strong’s historical
examination of origins is complementary to, and confirmatory of, the present
work.]
While
discussions of the metaphysical foundations of modern physics are comparatively
rare, discussions of its supposed implications are extremely popular. In fact
the implications of science are the happy hunting grounds of generations of
philosophers, and physicists turned amateur philosophers.
Anxious
theologians scan the latest scientific theories to see if they do or do not
support the existence of God. Grave scientists issue their pontifical
pronouncements. Sir James Jeans tells us that God is a great mathematician;
Einstein says ‘God is slick but not mean’; Laplace, answering Napoleon who
taxed him with not mentioning God in his Mécanique Céleste, said: ‘I
have no need of that hypothesis’.
Puzzled
philosophers delve into the intricacies of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
to determine if man does or does not possess free will, or to see if the law of
causality remains valid, or if it has to be replaced by statistical
probability.
[Footnote:
As representative of a multitude of contemporary philosophers, let us quote one
of the most acute, John Wisdom:
In
general philosophers concern themselves with paradoxes arising from facts that
come under their observation. It is important that they should be alive to the
paradoxes arising from quantum facts. Such facts cannot be shelved as merely
technical or as belonging to a special department; they are facts along with
all the other more familiar facts about nature they are no less real because
revealed by complicated laboratory apparatus than are those revealed by the
human eye. (Mind, Jan. 1947, p. 81)
These
remarks of Wisdom’s are largely vitiated by the author’s failure to take into
account the Procrustean character of physics. He is tacitly assuming a realist
theory or a passive phenomenalism (Ch. XVIII). ….
As an
amusingly ironic account of the extravagances into which popular opinion is led
by hypostatising the world of physics, let us quote from Aldous Huxley’s Time
Must Have a Stop (London, 1945), Ch. 8.
‘As I was
saying, Mr Barnack, everyone ought to know something of Einstein’.
‘Even
those who can’t understand what he’s talking about?’
‘But they
can, the other protested. ‘It’s only the mathematical techniques that
are difficult. The principle is simple – and after all, it’s the understanding
of the principle that affects values and conduct’.
Eustace
laughed aloud.
‘I can
just see my mother-in-law changing her values and conduct to fit the principle
of relativity!’
‘Well of
course she is rather elderly’, the other admitted. ‘I was thinking more
of people who are young enough to be flexible. For example, that lady who acts
as Mrs Gamble’s companion …’
‘…
Mathematically speaking, almost illiterate’, the young man was saying. ‘But
that doesn’t prevent her from realizing the scope and significance of the
Einsteinian revolution’.
‘And what
a revolution’, he went on with mounting enthusiasm. ‘Incomparably more
important than anything that had happened in Russia or Italy. For this was the
revolution that had changed the whole course of scientific thinking, brought
back idealism, integrated mind into the fabric of Nature, put an end for ever
to the Victorians’ nightmare universe of infinitesimal billiard balls’.
‘Too
bad’, said Eustace in parenthesis. ‘I really loved those little billiard
balls’.]
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